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Artworks as dichotomous objects:
implications for the scientific study
of aesthetic experience
Robert Pepperell *
Cardiff School of Art & Design, Cardiff Metropolitan University, Cardiff, UK
This paper addresses an issue that has been studied from both scientific and art
theoretical perspectives, namely the dichotomous nature of representational artworks.
Representational artworks are dichotomous in that they present us with two distinct
aspects at once. In one aspect we are aware of what is represented while in the
other we are aware of the material from which the representation is composed. The
dichotomy arises due the incompatibility, indeed contradiction, between these aspects
of awareness, both of which must be present if we are to fully appreciate the artwork.
Examples from art history are given to show how artists have exploited this dichotomy in a
way that conditions our response to their work. I hypothesize that the degree of manifest
dichotomy in a work determines the strength of its aesthetic effect, and propose this
could be experimentally tested. I conclude that scientific studies of aesthetic experience
should take the dichotomous nature of artworks into account.
Keywords: art, aesthetics, picture perception, neuroaesthetics, dichotomy, ambiguity
Introduction
The question of why artworks can have a strong aesthetic effect has long occupied art historians,
theorists and philosophers. It has also been of great interest to psychologists and, more recently,
neuroscientists. These diverse disciplines have tended to work in relative isolation however, and
much still needs to be done to integrate the knowledge each has accumulated. While the task is
daunting due to its scale and complexity, the potential rewards in terms of enriched understanding
are great. The approach taken here is to focus on a specific feature of aesthetic experience that
has been analyzed from different disciplinary perspectives and identify where the analyses agree.
On the basis of such agreement new hypotheses can be generated and tested experimentally,
so deepening, and broadening our knowledge in a way not possible within a single discipline
alone. This theoretical article addresses one such feature, namely the dichotomous nature of visual
representational artworks, as exemplified Rembrandt self-portrait seen in Figure 1.
Most of us looking at this work will be aware that it has two discrete aspects. We see a man, the
artist himself, posed rather confidently inmanner that alludes to portraits by Renaissance artists like
Raphael and Titian. But we are also aware this is not a man but an etching composed of countless
lines printed onto paper. This is the dichotomy. It does not feel as if we experience these discrete
aspects alternately or exclusively, i.e., a man in historical costume and then lines of ink on paper, or
vice versa.1 In purely logical terms this is odd. A single object appears as two quite distinct things.
1I am not excluding the possibility that some people experience these two states alternately or sequentially, but have so far
found no reports in the literature that they do. Also, on a more general note, the accounts of my experiences when looking at
the artworks discussed in this paper are based on seeing them in person. Many of the properties that contribute to aesthetic
effects described here are less evident in reproduction.
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FIGURE 1 | Rembrandt van Rijn, Self-portrait leaning on a stone sill,
1639, etching on paper. Photograph of a reproduction owned by the author.
Turner’s Rain, Steam, Speed (National Gallery, London, 1844,
Figure 2) presents us with a mass of vigorously applied paint, the
handling of which pronounces its material properties. We also
see a locomotive engine pulling carriages across the Maidenhead
Railway Bridge through heavy rain. The paint here functions
both as matter spread over a surface and as sky, brick, steam,
metal, water, clouds, and fields. The dichotomy is more evident
when the work is seen in person because the materiality of
the surface “interferes” with our recognition of the forms. This
can be witnessed to some extent in the detail of the painting
shown in Figure 3. Seen at closer quarters the engine hovers
between appearing as solid metal and buttery paint and the
poor passengers in the open-top carriages almost dissolve into
gray blobs. If we focus too closely on a single patch of paint
the object it forms disappears and with it the dichotomous
effect.
It is not only pictures that are dichotomous in this way. When
looking at the sculpture made by Pablo Picasso in 1942 titled
Bull’s Head (Figure 4) either in person or in reproduction, we
perceive a bull-like form and bicycle parts.2 Picasso was clear
2This example differs from others given here in that the raw materials used, the
metal and leather, serve a double function in constituting both bicycle parts and
bull-like parts. In the Rembrandt, by contrast, the ink only serves to evoke the
artist. This is an important distinction, but not critical to the general argument.
FIGURE 2 | Joseph Mallord William Turner, Rain, Steam, Speed: The
Great Western Railway, 1844, Oil on Canvas, National Gallery, London.
Turner Bequest, 1856. ©The National Gallery, London.
FIGURE 3 | Detail from Joseph Mallord William Turner, Rain, Steam,
Speed: The Great Western Railway. © The National Gallery, London.
about the importance of this dichotomy to the aesthetic impact
of the piece:
Guess how I made the bull’s head? One day, in a pile of objects
all jumbled up together, I found an old bicycle seat right next to a
rusty set of handlebars. In a flash, they joined together in my head.
The idea of the Bull’s Head came to me before I had a chance to
think. All I did was weld them together... [but] if you were to see
only the bull’s head and not the bicycle seat and handlebars that
form it, the sculpture would lose some of its impact.3
This dichotomous effect is just as evident in a virtual medium
such as computer graphics. Figure 5 shows a depiction of a
British landscape by the painter David Hockney, which in its
3Quoted in Brassai (2002, p. 61).
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FIGURE 4 | Pablo Picasso, Bull’s Head (Tête de Taureau), 1942, Leather
and metal, 33.5× 43.5× 19cm, Collection Musée Picasso, Paris.
©Succession Picasso. Photo ©RMN-Grand Palais (musée Picasso de
Paris)/Béatrice Hatala. DACS, London 2015.
native format is composed only of illuminated pixels on an iPad.
Here we see something that vividly appears as a puddle-filled
country lane in spring and yet is also just as evidently a series
of marks made with digital ink on a screen. The fact we see a
vivid natural scene made of wiggly digital lines, just as we see
Rembrandt and all the textures of his clothing composed of inky
scratches, is part of what makes these images fascinating to look
at, and part of what makes them works of art.4
The dichotomy between these two aspects of awareness is one
that all representational works of art exploit because they appear
both as an arrangement of materials such paint, ink, plaster,
metal, stone, etc. and as whatever they represent. As we will
see, many theorists have argued is a requirement of appreciating
such artworks that we are aware of both distinct appearances
simultaneously. They agree with Picasso that if we saw only a
pair of bike parts or just the form of a bull’s head much of the
shock, surprise, or amusement we feel when seeing the work
would be lost.5
4Paradoxically, we see neither an actual puddle nor just digital marks.
5With considerable mental effort I am able to suppress almost entirely the image of
the animal-like form and see the bicycle parts for what they are. But I do not seem
to be able to do the opposite. It is also interesting to note that when Bull′sHead
was first shown publicly in Paris in 1942 it provoked controversy and was taken off
display, suggesting it had a disruptive effect on its audience (Utley, 2000).
FIGURE 5 | David Hockney, The Arrival of Spring in Woldgate, East
Yorkshire in 2011 (twenty eleven)–29 December, No. 2, iPad drawing
printed on four sheets of paper (46 1/2× 35′′ each), mounted on four
sheets of Dibond, Edition of 10, 93× 70′′ overall. ©David Hockney. Photo
Credit: Richard Schmidt.
It is important to note that the phenomenon being described
here is not simply a kind of ambiguity or bi-stability. Ambiguous
or bi-stable pictures, as generally understood in perceptual
psychology, permit the viewer to alternate between two (or
sometimes more) interpretations, as in the cases of the Necker
cube, Rubin vase, or Duck-Rabbit, where the competing
meanings are exclusive. The fact we are also aware of the patches
of ink or pixels from which such pictures are composed is
rarely noted. It may be possible to supress awareness of the
representational aspect of a picture and see it only as a pattern of
ink marks or patches of pixel color. But this is not generally how
we treat such pictures; it would be the equivalent of persuading
oneself to see Jastrow’s duck as merely a mass of lines, and to lose
the object altogether.6 In general, then, the dichotomous effect
occurs when distinct meanings within a representational object
are experienced simultaneously whereas with ambiguous or bi-
stable images different meanings are experienced alternately.
“Dichotomy” is apt word to describe this state of affairs
as it captures the sense of insoluble conflict between mutually
6I am also able to interpret the Necker cube as a layout of contiguous flat
rhomboids, but find it impossible to see it only as a series of black lines.
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exclusive but simultaneously occurring states.7 Works of art are
not unique in this respect. Most forms of representation in which
material is organized so as to evoke something other than itself
will have the same character, including writing, the use of signs
and symbols, photography, cinematography, computer graphics,
sound recording, music, and is arguably what structures the
signifier-signified relationship between sounds and meaning in
language itself.8 But I will argue there is something special about
the way artists exploit this property that is an important part
of how artworks function aesthetically and which any scientific
explanation of aesthetic experience will need to take into account.
The dichotomous nature of pictures and paintings has been
studied in several science, arts and humanities contexts, although
described using different terms. I review a number of these
studies to show that despite the different disciplinary contexts
there is broad agreement about how these objects function.
In particular, there is a recurring suggestion that pictures and
paintings induce a kind of “dual” or “split” state of mind
in which we are aware of distinct and incompatible aspects
of the work simultaneously.9 Many authors characterize this
state as “impossible,” “contradictory,” or “paradoxical,” in other
words as irrational. Despite the frequency with which this has
phenomenon been noted, and the eminence of some of those
who have noted it, there has so far been no concerted attempt
to provide a scientific explanation.
Building on this previous work on the duality of pictures
and paintings, I will propose there are three aspects to the
dichotomous nature of representational artworks that can
condition our aesthetic response: first, we are aware of the
discrepancy between the matter from which the artwork is
composed and what it represents; second, we are aware of
discrepancies between the way things are represented in the
artwork and how we would expect them to look in reality; and
third, we are aware of many distinct conflicting meanings that
attach to the same work at the same time. I will present some
specific examples from art history that illustrate these aspects,
and suggest a provisional hypothesis about how they contribute
to an artwork’s aesthetic impact. Finally, I will consider the
implications of these observations for the scientific study of
aesthetic experience.
7The Oxford English Dictionary defines “dichotomy” as “division into two
sharply defined or contrasting parts; (Logic) division into two mutually exclusive
categories or genera.” Note that here that as with all the works discussed we are
looking at a reproduction of the painting. This adds at least two further layers of
representation, the photograph taken of the work and the medium in which that is
reproduced, i.e., digital or mechanical print.
8The distinction between “signifier” and “signified” was drawn by the linguist
Ferdinand de Saussure, and referred to the form on the one hand and the meaning
on the other of the linguistic sign (De Saussure, 2011).
9There are many works of art that, arguably, do not present us with the same
dichotomy because they are not representational in the commonly understood
sense. For example, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) does not purport to stand
in for anything other than itself (although this has not prevented critics from
comparing its appearance to a seated Buddha). Many entirely abstract paintings
lack depictive content, as do many sculptures, performances, happenings, and
social interventions. And even certain representational objects reveal no tension
between material and referent, as with certain trompe l’oeil paintings, where the
material surface is effectively invisible. On this, see Pirenne (1970) and Polanyi
(1970).
The Dichotomous Nature of Picture
Perception
Not all artworks are pictures, and not all pictures are artworks.10
Yet all pictures share with all representational artworks the
property of being dichotomous objects. The dichotomy has been
recognized by a number of important researchers in picture
perception. Pirenne (1970) talked of the “subsidiary awareness”
we have of the material surface when directing our attention the
contents of a picture, the importance of which he believes has
been largely overlooked in theories of pictorial representation.
Gibson (1978 and 1979) noted the way a picture acts both as a
physical surface and a display of information about something
else: “The viewer cannot help but see both, yet this is a paradox,
for the two kinds of awareness are discrepant” (1979, p. 282).
In similar vein, Gregory (1970) regarded pictures as occupying
a contradictory “double reality” in which “they are seen both as
themselves and as some other thing, entirely different from the
paper or canvas of the picture.” He wrote:
Pictures are paradoxes. No object can be in two places at the same
time; no object can lie both in two- and three-dimensional space.
Yet pictures are both visibly flat and three-dimensional. They are
a certain size, yet they are also the size of a face or a house or a
ship. Pictures are impossible.11
In one sense, pictures are clearly not impossible because we see
them all the time and have little trouble recognizing their content.
But Gregory suggests our capacity to appreciate the “double
reality” of pictures somehow falls outside the conventional
bounds of rationality. It is not pictures in themselves that are
paradoxical, contradictory, or impossible but our perceptual and
cognitive responses to them.
Developmental studies tell us the capacity to appreciate this
aspect of picture recognition is acquired only gradually in early
life. DeLoache and colleagues investigated anecdotal reports that
very young children would frequently treat objects in pictures
as though they were real (DeLoache et al., 2007). Children
were observed, for example, trying to step into a picture of
a shoe or grasping a depicted object, indicating they were
yet to appreciate the representational nature of pictures. By
studying the behavior of 9-month-old children presented with
vividly illustrated picture books, the experimenters were able to
substantiate the anecdotal evidence and show that, in fact, such
behavior is very common among children of that age. A cross-
cultural comparison between middle class children raised in the
USA and impoverished children from the Ivory Coast, who had
far less exposure to printed pictures, showed a pattern of behavior
that was remarkably similar. The researchers found that by the
time the children reached infanthood, around 19 months old, the
observed behavior had changed, with children tending to point to
or name depicted objects in books rather than try and pick them
up. They concluded that while children can recognize objects
within pictures at an early age without having to specifically learn
10The word “picture” is used here in the sense of depiction. Images may take many
forms, not all of which are depictive.
11Gregory, 1970, p. 32.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 295
Pepperell Artworks as dichotomous objects
to do so it does take time and experience to realize that objects
and pictures of objects are different. This capacity appears to be
well-established in children by the age of around 2 years. Preissler
and Bloom (2007) investigated whether children with a mean age
of 30 months were able to appreciate what they called the “dual
nature of pictures” and found they had the same ability to do so
as a group of adults given the same tasks. However, Jolley (2008)
using a different methodology argues that it is only by the age
of 3 or 4 years that children fully appreciate the dual nature of
pictures, which he defines as occurring when “an individual is
not constrained to thinking about the picture either as a thing in
itself or as a representation of another reality (the referent), but is
aware of both components at the same time” (Jolley, 2008, p. 94).
Approaching the topic from the perspective of perceptual
psychology, Rainer Mausfeld uses the term “conjoint
representations” to denote the doubled and “mutually
incompatible” meanings present at the same time within a picture
(Mausfeld, p. 25). He argues both these representations are
“internally locked,” that is, bound together within the cognitive
system in a way that allows us to exploit the same perceptual
input in two different ways. Although little understood, this
process must be a fundamental feature of cognition, he suggests,
because conjoint representations occur not just in picture
perception but also in many other areas of human behavior. He
cites several examples, including in language use, in pretend play
and acting where the imaginary world inhabited by player or
actor contradicts the real world in which the pretense occurs,
and in art where we can impute emotional states to something
we know to be a flat, static image such as a photograph or print.
An etching of a crying woman by Picasso is given as an example.
Niederée and Heyer (2003) attribute the dual nature of
pictures not to the objects themselves but to the psychological
process by which we perceive them. In their view, the standard
framework of perception cannot account for the way we
experience pictures. This predicts that from a given retinal
stimulus we will infer the presence of a picture as an object
or what the picture represents, but not both at the same time.
The fact we are aware of both aspects simultaneously may be
explained, they say, by our ability to switch attention between the
salient features of the representation and our residual awareness
of the flat surface. Crucially, these dual aspects do not coexist
in parallel but compose a single “perceptual unit” (p. 82). In
other words, there is one percept containing two aspects, and it
is only when both aspects are present simultaneously that picture
perception proper occurs. In this way they distinguish pictures
from other forms of image that lack this dual property, such
as trompe l’oeil or entirely abstract paintings. Like Mausfeld,
Niederée and Heyer also regard the capacity to experience duality
phenomena as not being confined to pictures or art but as a
more general feature of our cognitive constitution, to be found
in phenomena such as the perception of mirrors and shadows.
They also note that certain works of art, such as paintings by
Arcimboldo (discussed below), comprise special cases of pictures
that increase our awareness of their duality.
We can see that among those interested in the psychology
of the perception of pictures there is recognition of their
dichotomous nature, whether referred to in terms of subsidiary
awareness, double reality, conjoined representations, or duality.
While they do not consider artworks in detail, these studies
do offer some suggestions about how the dichotomous aspects
of pictures may contribute their aesthetic effects. For instance,
several authors point to there being something unusual or out of
the ordinary in our response to pictures that does not seem to be
accounted for within the standard paradigm of perceptual theory,
namely that they require us to be simultaneously aware of distinct
and mutually contradictory aspects of the same object. The
same observation has been made by a number of art theorists,
historians, and philosophers who have focused more specifically
on the dichotomous nature of paintings.
The Dichotomous Nature of Paintings
The dichotomous nature of representational paintings has been
a longstanding topic of debate among historians, theorists and
philosophers of art, and continues to be. Much discussion has
centered on a claim made by Ernst Gombrich in Art and Illusion
that it is not psychologically possible to attend to the content of
a painting and its material support at the same time. Referring
to the painter Maurice Denis’ declaration that a painting, before
being a battle horse, is first a plane surface covered in an
arrangement of paint, Gombrich said:
But is it possible to “see” both the plane surface and the battle
horse at the same time? If we have been right so far, the demand is
for the impossible. To understand the battle horse is for a moment
to disregard the plane surface. We cannot have it both ways.12
Gombrich is unequivocal. We cannot attend to both the painted
surface and the battle horse at once, and the more compelling
the illusion of the horse the less likely we are to attend to the
substrate from which it is composed. Speaking of the “men-
in-a-tunnel” illusion, a version of which is shown in Figure 6,
Gombrich asserts that with some effort we might see the image as
no more than a pattern of lines, and so “lose” the men and tunnel.
Our perception might then revert to seeing the men and tunnel
again, or oscillate between the two ways of seeing. But we cannot
see the image both as a pattern of lines and as men in a tunnel at
the same time, just as we cannot see the two orientations of the
Necker cube simultaneously or the duck and rabbit together in
that illustration.
The philosopher Richard Wollheim took exception to
Gombrich’s claim. He argued it was a necessary condition of
seeing representations that we are simultaneously aware of the
object depicted and the medium of which it is composed. He
developed a “twofold” thesis in which “visual attention must be
distributed between two things,” namely the surface in which the
representation is inscribed and the object depicted (Wollheim,
1980, p. 213). In its original formulation, Wollheim thought of
these two things as distinct experiences, but later modified this to
make both parts of a single experience.
Perhaps the most durable contribution Wollheim made to
the debate about pictorial perception was his deployment of the
12Gombrich, 1960, p. 236.
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FIGURE 6 | The “men in a tunnel illusion.” Based on the image included
by Ernst Gombrich in Art and Illusion.
notion of “seeing-as,” derived fromWittgenstein, later elaborated
into the notion of “seeing-in.” Wollheim describes seeing-as in
terms of the capacity to see one thing as another. For example,
when I mistake a bag on a chair for a cat I see the bag as a cat. In
such a case, there is no twofold quality to the perception. In the
case of seeing-in, however, “. . . I can simultaneously be visually
aware of the y that I see in x and the sustaining features of this
perception.” (p. 213) In support of his twofold thesis, and against
what he takes to be Gombrich’s position that we can only alternate
between attending to the depiction and its substrate, Wollheim
describes the aesthetic experience of looking at great paintings:
. . . in Titian, in Vermeer, in Manet we are led to marvel endlessly
at the way in which line or brushstroke or expanse of color is
exploited to render effects or establish analogies that can only be
identified representationally, and the argument is that this virtue
could not have received recognition if, in looking at pictures, we
had to alternate visual attention between the material features and
the object of representation.13
The precise way in which this dissociation between material and
representation in pictures is sustained, and how the two parts of
the twofold experience are related is not explained (Wollheim
talks about the way artists seeks a “rapport” between them).
Nevertheless, the twofold thesis, in various forms, is now widely
accepted as a necessary condition for pictorial representation and
the appreciation of representational art.14
13Wollheim, 1980, p. 216.
14Despite the polarity between Gombrich and Wollheim, a careful reading of the
key texts suggests they may have been less far apart than appears. This is because
it seemsWollheim misunderstood, or misrepresented, the central claim Gombrich
made. Returning to themen-in-a-tunnel example, Gombrich only states something
which is clearly true—that we cannot attend to the ink marks as an abstract pattern
of lines at the same time as seeing the men in the tunnel. Wollheim takes this to
mean we cannot see both the men in the tunnel and the ink marks fromwhich they
are made at the same time. But this is not Gombrich’s point. Refer to the quotation
Posing the question “what is a painting?” Polanyi (1970)
largely follows Pirenne in distinguishing between the awareness
we have of the representational content of a work and our
subsidiary awareness of the canvas and brush strokes from which
it is composed. He does allow that we may attend more to
the representational content or the material form depending
on how we view the work, whichever we choose being the
subject of what he calls our “focal awareness.” Although the
subject of this focal or subsidiary awareness can alternate, in
order for an object to be read as a painting, in his terms, we
must comprehend both. He says “a painting includes both the
perspectival depth of its paint and the flatness of its canvas, these
two contradictories being seen as one joint quality, and this is
indeed the quality that distinguishes a normal painting” (1970,
p. 229). Again, he stresses the dichotomous state this engenders:
“This union is not a fusion of complementary parts into a whole,
but a fusion of contradictory features. The flatness of a canvas is
combined with a perspectival depth, which is the very opposite
of flatness.” (p. 23, emphasis in original). What contributes to
the affective power of a work is the way it can elicit deep
memories, emotions or associations as we recognize the content,
while at the same time we are confronted with the artificiality
of the medium through which they are evoked. He argues the
irreconcilable conflict that results goes beyond anything else to
be found “in nature or in human affairs,” becoming what he
calls “transnatural.” He concludes: “works of art are generally
formed through integration of two incompatible elements, one
of these being an attempted communication and the other an
artistic structure that contradicts the communication.” (p. 235)
It is through our experience of this incompatibility that works
of art, not just visual but also theatrical and literary, have their
power to move us.
In a book that, like Polanyi, asks What is Painting? the
artist and writer Julian Bell argues that what is significant about
representations is that they confront us with a contradictory
sense of things that are present but also absent (Bell, 1999). He
talks about the “mark” as a material object to which we assign
associations, whether this is the intentional mark made by artist
or the incidental mark made the skid of a tyre, or a boot print in
the ground:
We see it and we see past it, or into it; it is what it is and a reminder
of something else besides. It is when we see something in that
double, ambivalent manner that we call it a mark. Seen another
way, it might be so many grams of paint, or of rubber, or of a hole
of such and such a depth in the ground.15
The philosopher Jennifer Church refers to the way we experience
a kind of “double consciousness” when seeing landscape
paintings:
from ArtandIllusion above. What Gombrich means by “see” in this context is not
that we do not register the plane surface in our awareness, but that we do not see
it just as a plane surface—an abstract agglomeration of marks—when we see it as a
battle horse. This seems to be quite right, and does not rule out the kind of twofold
experience that Wollheim describes. It is a point made lucidly by Bantinaki (2007).
15Bell, 1999, p. 26.
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When we see an X as Y (a painting as a landscape, say) we
partake in a kind of double-consciousness, experiencing a thing
in two different ways simultaneously (the painting way and the
landscape way)—ways that retain their independence despite
their convergence on a single object at the same time.16
Church’s explanation of this double consciousness draws on a
Kantian framework in which “. . .we experience different ways
of seeing, or different appearances, as both conflicting and
convergent whenever we are conscious of objects. . . ” (p. 109). In
her view, an object—the painting—can also have the appearance
of something else—a landscape—because it is a requirement of
conscious seeing in general that we conceive the different aspects
from which it is possible to view a scene, but that these converge
in our own single view. Our perception of the painting as an
object conflicts with but also converges with its appearance as a
landscape. In this way, Church retains the contradictory dualistic
character of representations while seeking overall conceptual
unity in the experience.17
In addition to what was said on this topic by psychologists,
there is recognition among art theorists and philosophers of
what I have termed the dichotomous nature of representational
artworks. Moreover, there are clear points of agreement across
these disciplines about how pictures and representational
paintings function, in particular that we experience these dual
aspects as bound together and distinct at the same time. It is this
property that several authors have associated with contradictory
or paradoxical states of mind in those who view the objects. By
looking at a series of examples of works of art, as we will do in the
next section, we can see how these dichotomous properties have
been exploited ormanipulated by artists in order to condition our
responses to their work.
The Aesthetic Effects of Artworks as
Dichotomous Objects
The OED offers a supplementary definition of dichotomy as
something paradoxical, ambivalent, or contradictory.18 It is
these “impossible” qualities of representations referred to by
Richard Gregory that artists have been long aware of and have
deliberately exploited for aesthetic effect. Guiseppe Arcimboldo’s
arrangements of fruit, vegetables, flowers, and other objects that
metamorphose into formally posed heads can seem frivolous
compared with the heavily religious subjects of his Mannerist
contemporaries. But they are part of a highly cultivated tradition
in European art in which the illusory and deceptive nature of
painting is made the subject of painting itself.19
Looking at the example from Musée du Louvre in Paris
in Figure 7, we are aware of several distinct representational
layers co-existing in the same plane: the painted surface, the
16Church, 2000, p. 99.
17Church would perhaps benefit here from consideration ofWollheim’s distinction
between seeing-as and seeing-in, where the former has no requirement that we
keep the distinction between the represented object and the material support in
mind at the same time.
18Oxford English Dictionary, ibid.
19For an account of the history of this tradition see Stoichita (1997).
FIGURE 7 | Giuseppe Arcimboldo, The Spring, 1563, Oil on oakwood,
66× 50cm, Musée du Louvre, Paris. Photo ©Musée du Louvre, Dist.
RMN-Grand Palais/Angèle Dequier.
cornucopia of flower heads and leaves, and the emerging figure
in profile.20 As Niederée and Heyer note above, we immediately
appreciate these distinct layers, and indeed it is necessary for the
striking effect of the painting that we do, despite the inherent
discrepancies between them. The cornucopia, for example, is
recognizable independently from the profile, despite each being
composed of the same forms and of the same paint. In one
section a flower is an ear and also an arrangement of paint and
in another leaves appear both as themselves and a shoulder. The
fact that the profile is composed of vegetation draws attention to
the mismatch between the head-like form we see before us and
the way we know a real head should look. As with Picasso’s bull,
we perceive something that looks like a head and not like a head.
The overall effect is to induce a degree of perceptual dissonance
that is exciting, if not somewhat disturbing.
Perhaps the most iconic example of pictorial paradox and
contradiction in twentieth century art is René Magritte’s The
Treachery of Images (Figure 8). This work manifests the slippery
conceptual properties that mostly remain submerged in our
daily dealings with pictures, but which Magritte provocatively
exposes through his title. The Treachery of Images, better known
as “This is not a pipe,” is at once a bald statement of the
obvious and a crafty self-denial, a patently true proposition
that also undermines its own premise, a visual manifestation
of the paradox wherein the statement “This statement is false”
20As noted, seeing the painting in reproduction adds two further layers: that of the
photograph taken from the work and the final means of reproduction, printed or
electronic.
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is both true and false, and a darkly humorous thesis on the
indeterminacy of language and meaning. It is the “unreal”
manner of its handling, as blandly illustrative, which alerts us
to the dissonance between what we would expect to see in
the presence of a real pipe and the pipe-like shape we actually
confront. The philosopher Michel Foucault did his best to
unravel the mystery of the painting by presenting it (not entirely
convincingly, in my view) as a calligram—a word-image of the
kind associated with Guillaume Apollinaire, the poet, critic and
early supporter of the Cubist movement (Foucault, 1983). But
like all true paradoxes, The Treason of Images cheerfully resists
any attempt at rationalization and stubbornly asserts the fact
that the shape above the words is clearly a pipe, and yet—being
confected from paint—is also not a pipe.
Robert Gober’s Untitled, from San Francisco Museum of
Modern Art, consists in a plastic sack molded in beeswax and
adorned with paint and human hair to look like a nudemale torso
(Figure 9). The work has an immediate visceral impact when
seen in the “flesh” as the perceptual system struggles to process
an object that is a sack and torso at the same time, objects that
in normal circumstances are quite distinct. We are put in mind
of the “body bag,” a conveyance for mutilated corpses, of which
this appears to be an example. Yet at the same time it is too
witty a statement to be macabre. The creases take on a double
function, as folded flesh and plastic; the hair is real and yet at the
same time stands in for hair; the waxiness of the material’s surface
evokes greasy skin but is determinedly wax; the dots are paint and
flushed nipples. Seeing an object that is vividly a body but just
as vividly not a body is the perceptual equivalent of being given
something and having it taken away at the same time. Coping
with this dissonance must be a challenge for the cognitive system,
yet is a crucial part of the overall aesthetic effect of the work.
In a series of works made since the late 1980s, the sculptor
Rachel Whiteread produced casts of the inverse or negative
space around objects. In this way she famously materialized the
interior of an entire Victorian house in London in 1993 and was
commissioned in 1996 to produce a memorial to the Austrian
FIGURE 8 | René Magritte, The Treachery of Images, 1928/29, Oil on
canvas, 62× 81cm, Los Angeles, County Museum. ©ADAGP, Paris and
DACS, London 2015.
Jews who died in the Holocaust ofWorldWar II (Figure 10). The
work was eventually unveiled in 2000 and stands in Judenplatz
in the city center. Also known as the “Nameless Library,” the
memorial appears at a distance to be an ominous bunker robustly
constructed from blocks of masonry, but when approached turns
out to be a finely cast impression of hundreds of books on library
shelves. These books, and the imprint of heavy doors, all occupy
the space we would occupy if standing inside this imaginary
library. Everything is present only by negation. Concrete, which
FIGURE 9 | Robert Gober, Untitled, 1990, Beeswax, pigment, and
human hair, 60× 44 × 29cm, San Francisco Museum of Modern Art.
Photograph by the author. ©Robert Gober, Courtesy Matthew Marks Gallery.
FIGURE 10 | Rachel Whiteread, Judenplatz Holocaust Memorial, 2000,
Concrete, Judenplatz, Vienna. Image source: Wikimedia Creative
Commons. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Holocaust_Mahnmal_
Vienna_Sept_2006_001.jpg. By Gryffindor
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is the epitomicmaterial of permanence and solidity, conjures up a
sense of loss and invisibility. The fineness of the casting, with the
detail it picks up, only serves to reinforce the disparity between
what we imagine to be present and what we really see, between a
real door and an antithesis of a door.
The dichotomies manifested these artworks are of three
distinct but related kinds. First, in each work we are aware of
the disparity between its material constitution and the objects
it represents. This is clearly demonstrated in the Rembrandt
etching, where we see both the ink marked paper and the human
figure, or in the Hockney where the puddles and trees are also
wiggly lines of digital ink. In the Gober piece, the wax is formed
so as to represent a body and a bag, much as the metal and leather
in Picasso’s bull’s head is formed into bicycle parts and animal
parts. In Whiteread’s monument the concrete stands as itself and
also as book-filled shelves and doors, albeit rendered in reverse.
Arcimboldo plays an even trickier game by presenting us with
paint that is also flowers and, at the same time, with paint that is
both flowers and a human figure.
The second kind of dichotomy manifest in these works arises
from the disparity between how we expect an object to look and
how it actually looks in the work. We see this in the Gober, where
the hair and nipples evoke a human form while the bag-like
shape confounds our expectation of how a human form should
appear. Magritte deliberately rendered his pipe in a mannered
and banal way. We know immediately that real pipes do not look
like this, yet this does nothing to lessen our capacity to recognize
it as a pipe.21 The profile in the Arcimboldo is face-like enough,
but also sufficiently different to remind us it is not a face. The
putative bull’s head in the Picasso looks quite different from a real
bull.22 The effect of this kind of dichotomy is to strongly evoke
the presence of an object and at the same time remind us of its
absence.
The third way in which artworks manifest their dichotomous
nature lies in their capacity to elicit a multitude of distinct
and contradictory meanings in the mind of the viewer. It
is characteristic of great works of art that they cannot be
narrowly or precisely defined. Some researchers have argued
certain works of art are great precisely because they evoke
multiple or incomplete meanings (Zeki, 2004). There is still no
agreement among scholars about the correct interpretation of
Diego Velazquez’s epic studio set piece, Las Meninas (1656). But
partly because it encourages somany interpretations, the painting
is often regarded as the finest in the European tradition. It is this
capacity for conveying multiple meanings that Picasso referred to
in a remark to his biographer Roland Penrose: “when looking at a
picture, one should say that the more associations it can open up
21The way this work might have been received when first shown is now hard to
appreciate. We are used to everyday objects and popular forms such as illustrations
and comics being presented as high art. But showing an object in a fine art painting
that is depicted in a style more suggestive of commercial illustration would have
seemed, at best, incongruous to many people outside avant-garde circles in the
early twentieth century, and hence points to a further dichotomy raised in this
painting between expectation and delivery.
22There may come a point when the disparity between what is represented and
the way it is represented becomes so great that recognition fails. For many people
unused to interpreting them, the everyday objects in cubist still life paintings can
suffer this fate (Muth et al., 2013).
the better” (in Cowling and Roland, 2006, p. 264). Whether these
diverse meanings occur in the mind of the viewer at precisely
the same time, gradually accumulate through contemplation, or
fade in and out of awareness in turn is hard to determine from
introspection alone. Nonetheless, the fact that each work can
support multiple dichotomous meanings is an important part of
their overall aesthetic effect.
The way artworks exploit these three kinds of dichotomy may
be one of the factors distinguishing them from representational
objects in general. For while all pictures and representational
objects engender multiple and contradictory states of perception
by their dichotomous nature, works of art do this to a greater
extent. The photograph in Figure 10 of the Holocaust Memorial
is, like most photographs, a dichotomous object. Yet it is
unremarkable in itself when compared to the experience of
seeing the memorial in person. Or consider Figure 11 showing
a modern train crossing the same railway bridge depicted by
Turner in Figure 2. Although pleasant enough, it has none of
the difficulty, expressiveness, or atmosphere elicited by Turner’s
painting of the same subject. We have little reason to pay
attention to the fabric from which it is composed, nor does it
surprise us as a depiction of how a train would look crossing a
bridge.
Figure 12 shows a horse sculpture made by the artist Heather
Jansch, which is installed in the grounds of the Eden Project
in Cornwall in the UK. It has similarities with Picasso’s bull in
being an animal form composed of discarded objects. And as with
the Picasso, the effect of seeing the horse in person is striking
because we are aware of the co-presence of the horse form and the
driftwood. What makes it a less aesthetically compelling work of
art, I would argue, is its relative lack of dichotomous properties,
of conflicting or surprising associations. The form of the horse
matches quite closely what we would expect of a horse, unlike in
the Picasso where the bull form deviates to a greater extent from
our expectation of how a bull should look.
For many people, of course, the Jansch sculpture will be
aesthetically preferable to the Picasso precisely because the
FIGURE 11 | Photograph of a train crossing Maidenhead Bridge. By
kind permission of Stephen Dawson. ©Stephen Dawson, 2007.
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FIGURE 12 | Photograph of a sculpture of a horse made from driftwood
by Heather Jansch. Photograph by the author, 2010.
arrangement of matter follows more closely the expected form
of a horse. In this sense it is more “realistic” or recognizable,
and appears to show greater evidence of skill in its construction.
It is probable that the level of expertise of the viewer will be
an important factor in this judgment, with art experts being
inclined to favor the Picasso because it places greater demands on
imaginative resources and because it has deeper poetic resonance
(the leather of the seat evokes the skin of the animal, we think
of holding the handle bars and “taking the bull by the horns,” of
Picasso conjuring up a potent symbol of Spanish vitality from the
among the privations of wartime Paris, etc.). For all its skilful
construction, the wooden horse fails to ignite as many diverse
associations, and therefore ranks as a lesser work of art.
The Dichotomous Nature of Artworks and
Aesthetics
According to the literature reviewed here from both scientific
and art theoretical perspectives there is general agreement about
the dichotomous nature of pictures and paintings, albeit referred
to using different terms. As viewers we are aware of both their
material and representational properties simultaneously, despite
the fact these properties are distinct and mutually incompatible. I
have made a more specific claim about works of art in general,
which is that they manifest this dichotomy to a greater extent
than non-works of art and that they do so in three ways:
by drawing attention to the disparity between their material
constitution and their representational content, by alerting us to
a further disparity between the way objects are represented and
how we expect them to appear, and by encouraging awareness of
multiple diverse and conflicting associations. All these properties
are evident in the art historical examples presented here. Based
on these observations I offer the following hypothesis: that
our aesthetic experience of artworks is determined, in part, by
our awareness of their dichotomous properties. This hypothesis
predicts a correlation between manifest degree of dichotomy and
aesthetic effect, such that objects manifesting greater degrees
of perceived dichotomy will elicit a correspondingly stronger
aesthetic experience.23 The hypothesis further predicts higher
levels of art expertise will be a factor in preference for greater
degrees of perceived dichotomy.
Implicit support for these proposals can be found in the
literature linking ambiguity to aesthetic appreciation. Ambiguity,
as discussed in much of the literature on the psychology of
aesthetics, refers to vagueness or the capacity of the same
material to carry multiple meanings. It has long been regarded
as an important mechanism for heightening the aesthetic
impact of works of art (Empson, 1930; Kaplan and Kris, 1948;
Berlyne, 1971). In ambiguous works these meanings are open
to varying interpretations and may change or fluctuate over
time, or be resolved in a way that dispels the ambiguity. As
noted at the outset, the dichotomous state is characterized by
the simultaneous presence of conflicting meanings; these are
not open to reinterpretation or resolution if the state is to
remain. Some applications of the term ambiguity, however, do
seem to have an affinity with the dichotomous properties of
artworks discussed here. In the context of literary criticism,
for example, William Empson (1930) described seven kinds of
ambiguity used by poets and writers for literary effect, among
them the use of “full contradiction, marking a division in
the author’s mind.” Empson’s ambiguous types were further
elaborated by Kaplan and Kris (1948). They identified, among
others, “disjunctive ambiguities” containing several alternative
and mutually exclusive meanings, and “integrative ambiguities”
wheremanifoldmeanings interact to form a complex and shifting
pattern of overall sense. These different kinds of ambiguity are
employed in literary works to enhance their aesthetic value.
Berlyne (1971) discussed the way cubist paintings can present
the viewer with contradictory cues, where one segment of the
painting can belong at the same time to two objects. These
cues can be registered simultaneously, in which case they
generate incongruity or conflict, or they can suddenly alternate
in meaning, with one interpretation replacing another, giving
rise to an increase in arousal or surprise. More recently, Jakesch
and Leder (2009) showed that moderate levels of perceived
ambiguity or dissonance in modernist works of art are preferred
to those with low levels. Excessive levels of dissonance, however,
reduced this positive effect. A further study by Jakesch et al.
(2013) not only found that ambiguous artworks were rated
more positively than non-ambiguous ones but the fact they
were perceived as being harder to interpret made a contribution
to this positive effect. This suggests the perceptual problems
posed by ambiguous or dissonant artworks are experienced as
beneficial to their aesthetic value. Muth et al. (in press) reported a
robust correlation between degrees of ambiguity in artworks and
aesthetic preference, with greater perceived ambiguity leading to
higher ratings for liking and for interest. This positive aesthetic
rating was also enhanced if the viewers felt able to resolve
23Note that this formulation does not rule out the possibility that non-art objects
(such as found objects, kitsch objects, cultural artifacts, designed products, etc.) can
have powerful aesthetic impact, providing they still induce multiple contradictory
states. See Pepperell (2003) for an argument about the distinction between art
works and aesthetically stimulating objects.
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perceptual problems and gain insights into the meanings of the
works that were not obvious at the outset. The positive aesthetic
effect of semantic or perceptual ambiguity may be due not just
to resolving a conundrum, the authors suggest, but from the
“dynamic gain” ofmultiple insights acquired through the struggle
to reach resolution.
The perceived tension between how an object is represented
and how we expect it to appear may, in part, be accounted for
by the predictive coding model of visual perception (Friston
and Kiebel, 2009). Rather than continually adapting to incoming
stimuli, this model suggests the visual brain uses prior experience
to predict the most likely state of any given scene in advance,
and only updating this when a prediction error occurs, that is,
when the incoming information contradicts the expected state.
Van de Cruys and Wagemans (2011) have usefully applied this
paradigm to aesthetic response. They detail a number of cases
where artists have more or less deliberately induced prediction
errors by the way they have structured their works, leading the
viewer to struggle with interpreting the image. They argue this
has a generally beneficial effect as far as aesthetic experience
is concerned in that expending a certain amount of effort can
be pleasurable, especially if this effort is rewarded by solving
a perceptual conundrum. In the case of many artworks the
“error” between how we would expect an object to appear and
how it is represented might trigger a certain state of arousal
and so contribute to the aesthetic impact. Another approach
is to consider the way artists might subvert the brain’s object
recognition processing in order to heighten aesthetic impact.
In an analysis of the “visual shock” elicited by the disfigured
faces and bodies in Francis Bacon’s paintings, Zeki and Ishizu
(2013) argue the artist violated the brain’s templates for face and
body recognition. These templates are particularly robust, and
therefore more sensitive to distortions than areas of the brain
responsible for recognizing human-made artifacts, such as planes
and cars. They are also less prone to long-term adaptation, which
the authors suggest is why Bacon’s deformations can remain
disturbing, even after long-term exposure.
On the question of the relationship between art expertise
and preference for manifest dichotomy, it is recognized that
experts will cognitively process artworks in significantly different
ways from non-experts (Cupchik, 1992; Leder et al., 2004).
More specifically, recent research found art experts were less
emotionally affected by images with a negative or unpleasant
valence (Leder et al., 2014). The authors suggest this may be
because the aesthetic stance of the art expert is more detached and
distanced than the non-expert. Following this line of thought,
it may be more likely that art experts can tolerate, or even be
aroused by, images or objects that appear difficult, distressing, or
confounding to others.
Implications for the Scientific Study of
Aesthetic Experience
The hypothesis proposed here is founded on theoretical work
carried out in several different disciplines and is consistent with
some empirical research in the psychology of aesthetics. I have
argued, therefore, the dichotomous nature of artworks should be
taken into account in scientific studies of aesthetic experience,
certainly where representational artworks are concerned. For
those studying the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetic experience
there are a number of implications. For one thing, there
are obvious questions about the nature of the neurobiological
processes associated with the dichotomous experiences described
here. How is it, for example, that the mind can be aware of one
object having two meanings that are not just distinct but entirely
contradictory? Does the neural activity supporting awareness of
an object with dichotomous properties differ from that of an
object without, and if so how? Do we experience the distinct and
incompatible dichotomous states simultaneously, alternately,
or discretely? And if dichotomous experiences are inherently
irrational in that they are by nature impossible, contradictory
or paradoxical, as several researchers claim, then how could we
account for this within a rationalist scientific framework?
Mausfeld (2003) and others have suggested the human
capacity for appreciating the dichotomous nature of pictures
exemplifies a more general feature of human cognition. If this
is so, then the fact that it is expressed so markedly in the case
of art and aesthetic experience makes it an ideal vehicle for
studying this phenomenon in operation. Consider the many
other situations where we appreciate dual or contradictory
meanings simultaneously. Acting and pretend play have already
been mentioned, but also relevant are the many forms of humor
that rely on the apprehension of conflicting meaning,24 of stage
mimics and impressionists who convincingly evoke a sound or
personality we know not to be present, of ventriloquist dummies
the source of whose voices we simultaneously believe in and
disbelieve, of conjurers who perform acts that are apparently
possible but also impossible. In all these cases it is necessary we
are cognisant of the discrepancy between one reality and another,
and it is often the greater discrepancy that elicits the more potent
experience.
The phenomenon of the “uncanny valley” is interesting in
this regard. Coined by robotics engineer Mori (1970), it refers
to the way we can experience negative feelings of unease or
eeriness in the presence of a humanoid object that is almost
indistinguishable from a real human.Moore (2012) has suggested
the effect results from the processing of conflicting cues that
on the one hand strongly suggest human-ness and on the other
artificiality. His analysis shows that the more uncertain the
distinction the greater the sensation of eeriness. This uncanny
effect is a form of aesthetic response, which reminds us that
aesthetic experience should not be automatically thought of as
emotionally positive, or necessarily equated with appreciation of
beauty. It is certainly the case with many works that the effect on
24According to Weems (2014), the psychologist Richard Wiseman determined the
world’s funniest joke is one based on a Spike Milligan sketch: “Two hunters are out
in the woods when one of them collapses.” He doesn’t seem to be breathing and
his eyes are glazed. The other guy whips out his phone and calls the emergency
services. He gasps, “My friend is dead! What can I do?” The operator says “Calm
down. I can help. First, let’s make sure he’s dead.” There is a silence, then a gun
shot is heard. Back on the phone, the guy says “OK, now what?” (p. 26). The
contradiction here occurs, of course, between the two meanings of the phrase
“make sure he’s dead.”
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the viewer is intentionally disorientating, confusing, shocking or
repulsive (Leder et al., 2004; Silvia, 2009; Pepperell, 2011; Van de
Cruys and Wagemans, 2011).25
Much of the preceding literature, therefore, leads to the view
that dichotomous, ambiguous, or uncanny stimuli induce special
states of mind associated with heightened aesthetic effect. Why
should this be so? One suggestion arising from what has been
discussed here is that great artworks present us with paradoxical
or contradictory information that demands greater attention
and requires greater effort to process than do lesser works, so
inculcating a stronger sense of involvement with the work on the
part of the viewer. It may also be that awareness of the inherent
dichotomies embedded in certain artworks is emotionally
arousing due to the co-presence of conflicting sensations. This
involvement or arousal may not be straightforwardly pleasurable.
Indeed, it may be partly unpleasant. But it would create a more
intimate bond between viewer and work, and presumably leave a
greater impression on the mind, which might be measureable in
distinct patterns of neurobiological activity, behavioral response,
or memory effects.
A final point to note is that if the dichotomous nature of
pictures is an important part of the way we perceive them, as
the evidence cited here suggests, then it cannot be overlooked
when studying our response to pictures in experimental settings.
Neuroscientific studies of face perception, for example, will
usually be based on photographic stimuli, which for certain
experimental setups is the only practical option. We should
therefore be cautious about any conclusions drawn from these
studies that do not take the dichotomous pictorial factor into
account. For if the aim is to detect the responses to stimuli
with great sensitivity, and if the cognitive system is reacting to
a dichotomous stimulus in a way it would not be in the presence
of a real face, then this may have some bearing on the resulting
patterns of neural activation.
Conclusion
Study of the dichotomous nature of artworks may help us in
tackling some long-standing questions about the nature of art
and aesthetic experience, such as why we find great works
exciting or arousing and what distinguishes them from everyday
images or objects. I have argued that with representations of
little aesthetic interest, such as undistinguished photographs,
the dichotomy between material and meaning passes unnoticed.
Most likely this is because we are habituated to the dichotomous
effect through long and frequent exposure to representational
25I had a memorable experience of this uncanny effect in the presence of a
sculpture by the British artist Gavin Turk, which I viewed at close quarters in a
London show. The piece, Bum (1998), is a waxwork model of the artist dressed as
a tramp, and was so lifelike that it was almost impossible to tell if it was a model or
the artist in person holding a very still pose. This uncanniness was a vital part of
the work’s aesthetic impact.
objects, having learned to cope with their dual nature in early
childhood. But as we saw with the examples shown here, certain
artworks alert us to the dichotomy in a way that can be crucial
to their aesthetic impact. Consequently, the tension or conflict
between material support and manifest meaning becomes a
factor in the appreciation of the work. Further disparities
between the form in which something is represented and our
expectations about its appearance will contribute to this aesthetic
impact, along with the overall level of complexity induced
by the presence of multiple conflicting associations. Artworks
that are less aesthetically compelling lack such a diversity of
associations.
I have hypothesized that the degree of perceived dichotomy
is a factor in the strength of aesthetic response. The greater
effort and attention required to process contradictory or
paradoxical information will heighted arousal and awareness and
so strengthen the bond between viewer and work. In principle,
this should be experimentally measurable and the results could
provide insights into the neurobiology aesthetic experience.
Many researchers in the sciences and humanities have
described the dichotomous properties of pictures and
representational objects, and agree we are aware these properties
simultaneously, despite the fact they are mutually incompatible.
The claim that aesthetic experience is marked by contradictory,
paradoxical or impossible states of mind is an extraordinary one
since it implies a certain degree of irrationality is involved in
such experiences. While artists might be comfortable with this,
given they are demonstrably in favor of instilling their works
with paradoxical meanings, it may be harder to square with the
rationalist scientific framework underpinning neuroaesthetics in
particular, and cognitive neuroscience in general.
In order to leave the last word to an artist I close with a brief
extract from a conversation between the painter Francis Bacon
and the art critic David Sylvester:
Bacon: I want a very ordered image, but I want it to have come
about by chance.
Sylvester: It’s a matter of reconciling opposites I suppose, of
making the thing be contradictory things at once.
Bacon: Well, isn’t it that one wants a thing to be as factual as
possible and at the same time as deeply suggestive, or deeply
unlocking of areas of sensation. . . ? Isn’t that what all art is
about?26
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